This paper firstly revists the cross efficiency evaluation method which is an extention tool of data envelopment analysis (DEA), then analyzes the potential flawes which happens when the ultimate average cross efficiency scores are used. In this paper, we consider the decision making units (DMUs) as the players in a cooperative fuzzy game, where the characteristic function values of coalitions are defined to compute the Shapley value of each DMU with fuzzy data, and the common weights associate with the imputation of the Shapley values are used to determine the ultimate cross efficiency scores. In this paper cross efficiency defined with fuzzy data for solving fuzzy parameters problems.
INTRODUCTION
As a non-parametric programming efficiency-rating technique for a set of decision making units (DMUs) with multiple inputs and multiple outputs, data envelopment analysis (DEA) (Cooper et al., 2000) is receiving more and more importance for evaluating and improving the performance of manufacturing and service operations. It has been extensively applied in performance evaluation and benchmarking of schools, hospitals, bank branches, production plants, etc (Charnes et al., 1994) . However, traditional DEA models are not very appropriate for ranking DMUs since they simply classify the units into two groups: efficient and inefficient (Charnes et al., 1978) . Moreover, it is often possible in DEA that some inefficient DMUs are in fact better overall performers than some efficient ones. This is because of the unrestricted weight flexibility problem in DEA by being involved in an *Corresponding author. E-mail: Mojtaba.Ramezani.53@gmail.com. unreasonable self-rated scheme (Dyson and Thannassoulis, 1988) . The DMU under evaluation heavily weighs few favorable measures and completely ignores other inputs and outputs in order to maximize its own DEA efficiency. In the fuzzy game, each DMU will be a player, the characteristic function value of each coalition is defined, and the solution of Shapley value is computed to determine the ultimate cross efficiency of each DMU by Despotis (2002) . However, there are still several limitations for utilizing the average cross efficiency measure to evaluation, like the losing association with the weights by averaging among the cross efficiencies. In most real-world situations, the possible values of parameters of mathematical models are often only imprecisely or ambiguously known to the experts. It would be certainly more appropriate to interpret the experts understanding of the parameters as fuzzy numerical data which can be represented by means of fuzzy sets of the real line known as fuzzy numbers. In this study, we deal with problems with fuzzy parameters from the viewpoint of experts imprecise of the nature of parameters in a problem-formulation process. The fuzzy parameters issue can thus be solved in this paper.
CROSS EFFICIENCY EVALUATION
Adopting the conventional nomenclature of DEA, assume that there are n DMUs that are to be evaluated in terms of m inputs and s outputs of triangular fuzzy number. We denote the ith input and rth output for DMU ( 1,2, Now suppose that all players consider that the degree of all the membership functions of the fuzzy number involved in the linear programming problem should be greater than or equal to a certain degree α. Then, for such a degree α, the problem can be interpreted as the following non fuzzy linear programming problem which depends on a coefficient vector ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( )
Sakawa (1993). that the degree of all the membership functions for the fuzzy number in the problem (3) exceeds the level α. However, if the players think that the problem should be solved by taking an optimistic view, the coefficient vector
in the problem (4) would be chosen so as to maximize the objective functions under the constraints. From such a point of view, for a certain degree α, it seems to be quite natural to have understood the linear programming problem with fuzzy parameters as the following non fuzzy α-linear programming problem: are treated as decision variables rather than constants. Therefore, the problem (4) is not a linear programming problem. However, from the properties of the α-level set for the vectors of fuzzy number x% and y% it follows that the feasible regions for x% and y% can be denoted respectively by the closed intervals
. Thus, we can obtain an optimal solution to the problem (4) by solving the following linear programming problem by Sakawa (1993) . Conversely the players may think that the problem should be solved by taking a pessimistic view. Then taking opposite extreme points of the closed intervals
x x y y , we can formulate the following problem which yields a value of the objective function smaller than that the problem (5):
We obtain a set of optimal weights (5) and (6) can be calculated as:
Rating DMU
For DMU the average of all , ( 1,..., )
with same weights can be used as a new efficiency measure for j DM U and will be referred to as the cross efficiency score for j DM U .
As seen in Table 1 , when we move along the dth row of the matrix E of cross efficiencies, each element dj E is the efficiency that d DMU accords to j DM U , given the computed weighting scheme described above. The leading diagonal is the special case where DMU d rates itself. Each of the columns of the cross efficiency matrix (CEM) in Table 1 is then averaged to get a mean cross efficiency measure for each DMU. In fuzzy environment for (Table 1) .
DETERMINATION OF ULTIMATE CROSS EFFICIENCY USING FUZZY DEA GAME MODEL
Here, we will use the fuzzy DEA game model and Shapley value in, for determine the ultimate cross efficiency of each DMU.
Definition of DEA game
As defined in Table 1 n n dp dp p p
. For this purpose, we divide the row
, and denote the dth row after rowwise normalizing as
Similarly we can normalize data set R E . After using Charnes-Cooper transformation scheme, the linear program to select the most preferable weights for each DMU can be expressed as follows:
Let the coalition S be a subset of player set N= (1,…,n) . The record of the coalition S is defined by ( ) , 1,..., .
This coalition aims at obtaining the maximal outcome c(S):
The c(S), with ( ) 0 c ϕ = defines a characteristic function of the coalition S. thus, we have a game in coalition form with transferable utility, as represented by (N,c). We can easily find that the characteristic function c is a subadditive, so we consider the opposite side of the game (N,c), which is defined by replacing max in (11) and (12) by min as follows:
,
The optimal value d(j) assures the minimum division that player j can expect from the game. Analogously to the game (N,c), for the coalition S ⊂ N we define
From the description in 'Nakabayashi and Tone (2006) 
Where s is the number of members of coalition S. From the introduction above, we can get the conclusion that the games (N,c) and (N,d) are dual games, so they have the same Shapley value. 
Determination of common weights
Now we return to the subject incorporating our knowledge of imputation , and so the imputation z is explained by the common weight w * .
All players will accept the solution since it represents the common value judgment corresponding to the cooperative game solution.
Case 2:
0 p * > . In this case, we have no common weight w * which can express z as ,
perfectly, while the optimal weight vector w * can approximate the solution of the game within the tolerance p * .
The common weights, that is the optimal value of w in model (18) and (19), can be used to determine the ultimate cross efficiency of each DMU is expressed as follows:
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
To illustrate the proposed approach above, we consider a simple numerical example given in Table 2 involving five DMUs, with two inputs 1 2 , x x and one output 1 y in fuzzy environment. Suppose that the parameters are characterized by triangular fuzzy numbers as shown in Table 2 . By varying parameter α from 0.0 to 1.0 at intervals of 0.5, we construct the fuzzy values of row normalizing and cross efficiency for first and end of intervals (Tables 4 and 5 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the ultimate average cross efficiency scores in fuzzy environment. We eliminate the assumption of average and consider the DMUs as the players in a cooperative game, the characteristic function value of coalitions are defined to compute the Shapley value of each DMU, and the common weights associate with the imputation of the Shapley values are used to determine the ultimate cross efficiency scores. Regarding this subject, we have proposed a method for compute cross efficiency for fuzzy data, and transform fuzzy programs to non fuzzy for solving fuzzy numbers problem by α -level set of the fuzzy numbers.
